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I. INTRODUCTION
In an age where online transactions are quickly replacing face-
to-face interactions, there is a growing opportunity for criminals to
capitalize on the lack of traditional safeguards that would normally
protect an individual's identity.1 Unfortunately, consumers and their
banks have not been immune to these cyber-threats or third-party fraud.2
In fact, many consumers are reluctant to use online banking fearing that
their personal information may be stolen through fraudulent phishing
3
attempts. A consumer's social security number, date of birth, and
credit card information may all be stolen by criminals who use this
information to access bank accounts and steal money.5 To counteract
this growing threat, financial institutions have begun to develop
advanced security measures to enhance authentication procedures
related to protecting user identity in online banking. 6  The Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)7 is an organization
devoted in part to the authentication of identity in online banking
transactions and has issued a guidance document entitled Authentication
1. See David Navetta, The Duty to Authenticate Identity: The Online Banking Breach
Lawsuits, 8 A.B.A. SCITECH L. 22, 22 (2011).
2. See id.
3. David Koenigsberg, XI. Security with Online Banking, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 118, 119 (2006) ("Phishing, an example of access theft, 'uses spoofed e-mails,
purporting to be from reputable companies, requesting unsuspecting consumers to provide
personal financial information."').
4. Id. at 118 ("[H]alf of U.S. consumers are reluctant to bank online for fear of losing
their personal information.").
5. Id. at 119 ("The average loss per individual from phishing is $2,320.").
6. See Navetta, supra note 1, at 22.
7. FED. FIN. INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, http://www.ffiec.gov/ (last visited
Oct. 13, 2012) ("The Council is a formal interagency body empowered to prescribe uniform
principles, standards, and report forms for the federal examination of financial
institutions .... ).
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in an Internet Banking Environment ("2005 Guidance") 8 and a 2011
FFIEC Supplement 9  focused on outlining additional security
recommendations for banks.'0
However, despite a number of recent court decisions addressing
the topic, the exact law surrounding bank liability for third-party fraud
has been hard to define."' The First Circuit Court of Appeals' holding
in Patco Construction Co. v. People's United Bank,12 will undoubtedly
have a significant influence on establishing the legal standard for bank
security systems.' 3  However, the First Circuit's holding that the
security measures at issue were not "commercially reasonable"' 4 was
improper for two main reasons. First, its policy of avoiding a one-size-
fits-all approach to fraud prevention ignored previous precedent related
to online banking.' 5 Second, its holding will have the negative effect of
increasing fraud liability for banks that offer online banking services
and creating a large burden for smaller banks that will need to
implement additional advanced security measures in order to meet this
heightened "commercially reasonable" standard.' 6
This Note examines the First Circuit's decision in Patco,
concluding that the First Circuit's holding was misguided based on
precedent and important policy considerations. Part II provides a brief
introduction of the existing law surrounding bank liability for online
fraud and the role of the FFIEC.' 7 Part III introduces the Patco case,
8. Authentication in an Internet Banking Environment, FED. FIN. INSTITUTIONS
EXAMINATION COUNCIL (Oct. 12, 2005), available at
http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authentication-guidance.pdf.
9. Supplement to Authentication in an Internet Banking Environment, FED. FIN.
INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL (June 28, 2011), available at
http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/Auth-ITS-Final%206-22-11 %20(FFIEC%20Formated).pdf.
10. See Navetta, supra note 1, at 23.
11. See id. at 22.
12. Patco Const. Co. v. People's United Bank, 684 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2012).
13. See Tracy Kitten, 3 Lessons from PATCO Fraud Ruling, BANKINFO SECURITY (July
20, 2012) [hereinafter 3 Lessons], available at http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/3-lessons-
from-patco-fraud-ruling-a-4970.
14. U.C.C. § 4A-202 (2011) ("A security procedure is deemed to be commercially
reasonable if (i) the security procedure was chosen by the customer after the bank offered,
and the customer refused, a security procedure that was commercially reasonable for that
customer, and (ii) the customer expressly agreed in writing to be bound by any payment
order, whether or not authorized, issued in its name and accepted by the bank in compliance
with the security procedure chosen by the customer.").
15. See infra Part IV.B.
16. See infra Part V.B. 1,2.
17. See infra Part 11.
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discussing the facts behind the fraud attacks, Ocean Bank's security
system, the district court's decision, and the First Circuit's reversal. 18
Part IV discusses whether or not the First Circuit's holding was correct
by examining previous decisions related to online banking and
highlighting important policy considerations.' 9 Part V of this Note
provides recommendations for attorneys representing both banks and
consumers in light of the Patco decision.2°
II. BANK LIABILITY
Before there was guidance from the FFIEC, the majority of
states used Uniform Commercial Code § 4A-20221 to establish the
burden for any loss that occurred during the transfer of funds through
online banking.2 Under this section, if banks met certain security
requirements related to authenticating identity, then consumers would
bear the risk of any loss. 23 In order to have the benefit of this standard,
a bank's security procedures must have been found to be "commercially
reasonable. 24  However, Article 4A does not establish the specific
parameters of a security procedure that will be accepted by the courts,
leaving this to be developed on an ad hoc basis.
Due to the vague standard established by the U.C.C., the FFIEC
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part V.
21. See U.C.C. § 4A-202 (2011); see also Edwin E. Smith et al., First Circuit Sheds
Light on the Scope of "Commercially Reasonable" Security Measures for Funds Transfers,
BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP (July 24, 2012), http://www.bingham.com/Alerts/2012/07/First-
Circuit-Sheds-Light-on-the-Scope (summarizing U.C.C. §4A-202).
22. See Navetta, supra note 1, at 23; see also Stuart R. Hene, Funds Transfers Under
UCC Article 4A: What Is A Commercially Reasonable Security System?, 64 CONSUMER FIN.
L. Q. REP. 331, 331 (2010) ("Article 4A funds transfers may be originated in numerous
ways; e.g., a telephone call, a facsimile (FAX) message, or an intemet transfer. Many of
these transfers are now originated over the internet, and at the core of this information
infrastructure is cyberspace.").
23. See Smith et al., supra note 21 (stating that a bank could shift responsibility by
implementing a "commercially reasonable" system); see also Navetta, supra note 1, at 23
("Pursuant to this section, if a bank satisfies certain security requirements, including those
directly related to authenticating identification, its customers will be liable for fraudulently
transferred funds, even if the transfer was initiated by a criminal hacker. Conversely, if the
bank fails to meet such requirements, the bank will bear the risk of such losses.").
24. See Hene, supra note 22 (summarizing the factors that a court is to consider under
Article 4A).
25. See id.
2013]
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has long been concerned with the authentication of identity in online
banking transactions. 26  By issuing the 2005 Guidance, the FFIEC
hoped to aid banks and their consumers by providing security
recommendations for online banking transactions.27 After the 2005
Guidance was issued, however, online banking threats began to change
dramatically.28  In fact, advancements in technology created new
avenues 29 through which cyberthreats might arise. 30  As a result, a
significant gap between the FFIEC recommendations and the type of
security measures that would be effective arose, leading to a spike in
fraud rates and the number of at-risk customers.31  The increased
number of fraud cases led to an increase in litigation as courts struggled
to find the correct balance between consumer and bank liability.3 2 The
Patco case followed this long line of litigation33 that supported strictly
following U.C.C. § 4A-202 and deferring to FFIEC recommendations to
determine what is a "commercially reasonable" system.34 However, the
First Circuit's decision will likely make a large dent in this legal
landscape.
26. See Navetta, supra note 1, at 22.
27. See id.
28. FED. FIN. INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, 2011 FFIEC Authentication
Guidance: A New Standard for Online Banking Security (2011) [hereinafter 2011 FFIEC
Authentication Guidance], http://ffiec.bankinfosecurity.com/whitepapers.php?wp-id=492.
29. Cyber Security: Responding to the Threat of Cybercrime and Terrorism: Hearing
Before Subcomm. on Crime and Terrorism of the S. Judiciary Comm., 112th Cong. 1 (2011)
(statement of Gordon M. Snow, Assistant Director, Cyber Division, FBI) (outlining how
"smart home" products, industrial control systems, and malicious software are capable of
becoming significant threats).
30. 2011 FFIEC Authentication Guidance, supra note 28.
31. Id.
32. See Experi-Metal. Inc. v. Comerica Bank, No. 09-14890, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
62677 (E.D. Mich. June 13, 2011); Braga Filho v. Interaudi Bank, 334 F. App'x 381 (2nd
Cir. 2009); Covina 2000 Ventures Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No.
06 Civ. 15497, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32799 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2008); Regatos v. N. Fork
Bank, 257 F. Supp. 2d 632 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Centre-Point Merchant Bank Ltd. v. American
Express Bank Ltd., No. 95 Civ. 5000, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17296 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27,
2000).
33. See id.
34. See Kevin Funnell, Patco and Experi-Metals: How Much Hope Do They Really
Give Small Businesses?, BANK LAWYER'S BLOG (July 31, 2012),
http://www.banklawyersblog.com/3_bank lawyers/2012/07/patco-and-experi-metals-how-
much-hope-do-they-really-give-small-businesses.html.
THE EFFECT OF PA TCO
III. PA TCO
A. Fraud Attacks on Patco Construction Co.
In 2009 Patco Construction Co. (PATCO) revealed that over
$580,000 of its funds were stolen from the firm's commercial bank
account by an unknown third-party through a series of fraudulent online
transactions. 35 PATCO's accounts were held at Ocean Bank, a division
of People's United Bank located in southern Maine.36 These fraudulent
withdrawals were made on PATCO's accounts over the course of
several days beginning on May 7, 2009.37  The third-party initially
withdrew over $50,000 from PATCO's account by supplying the proper
credentials of one of PATCO's employees. 38 The credentials used to
access the account included the employee ID, password, and answers to
challenge questions.39  The initial withdrawal was directed to the
accounts of several unknown individuals. 40 As a result of the nature of
the withdrawal, Ocean Bank's security system produced a risk score of
790 out of 1000 for this transaction.4' Typically, risk scores over 750
were considered to be high risk.42 Factors such as a high risk amount
and IP anomaly43 contributed to the high risk score.44 Although the risk
score of this transaction might have been alarming, no one at Ocean
Bank was monitoring these types of transactions, and PATCO was not
notified of the suspicious withdrawals.45
The third parties then initiated more fraudulent transactions on
35. See Patco Const. Co. v. People's United Bank, 684 F.3d 197, 199 (1st Cir. 2012);
see also Tracy Kitten, Inside the PATCO Fraud Ruling, BANKINFO SECURITY (July 9, 2012)
[hereinafter Inside the PATCO Fraud Ruling], http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/inside-
patco-fraud-ruling-a-4927.
36. Patco, 684 F.3d at 199.
37. Id. at 204.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Inside the PATCO Fraud Ruling, supra note 35 (stating that the range of risk
scores is from 0-1000 with risk scores over 750 being considered high risk).
43. "IP Anomaly" is the appearance of a new, previously unrecognized IP address that
the Bank had never seen in a transaction. See id.
44. Patco, 684 F.3d at 204.
45. Id.
2013]
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May 8, 11, 12, and 13.46 All of these additional transactions produced
high risk scores, and the proceeds were sent to individuals to whom
PATCO had never sent funds.47 On May 14, it was finally determined
that the fraudulent transactions were a string of thefts when PATCO
informed Ocean Bank that it had not authorized the transactions. 4' In
total, the amount of money withdrawn from PATCO's account was
$588,851.26, of which only $243,406.83 was recovered.49 Following
the fraudulent withdrawals, Ocean Bank claimed that it gave PATCO
several recommendations about how to protect its system and mitigate
the damage from the attacks.50 However, PATCO claims that it only
received a single instruction to hire a forensic professional to check its
system for a security breach.5'
B. Ocean Bank's Security System
Beginning in 2004, Ocean Bank began using NetTeller, an
online banking platform provided by Jack Henry & Associates 52 (Jack
Henry).53 However in 2007, in response to the authentication guidelines
outlined by the FFIEC in 2005, 54 Ocean Bank began working with Jack
Henry to conduct a risk assessment and implement a new security
system that integrated a multifactor authentication system.55 A new
46. Id. at 205.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Patco Const. Co. v. People's United Bank, 684 F.3d 197, 204 (1st Cir. 2012)
("[Ocean Bank] instructed Patco to disconnect the computers it used for electronic banking
from its network; to stop using these computers for work purposes; to leave the computers
turned on; and to bring in a third-party forensic professional or law enforcement to create a
forensic image of the computers to determine whether a security breach had occurred.").
51. Id.at206.
52. Jack Henry & Associates, Inc. is a provider of core information processing
solutions for banks. See JACK HENRY,
http://www.jackhenry.com/Default.aspx?P=4fc 1 d089-1ObO-4cd 1-8e4c-9c6efcd85686 (last
visited Feb. 9, 2013).
53. Patco, 684 F.3d at 201 (stating that Jack Henry provided NetTeller to between
1,300 and 1,500 bank customers).
54. Id. ("Authentication methods that depend on more than one factor are more
difficult to compromise than single-factor methods. Accordingly, properly designed and
implemented multifactor authentication methods are more reliable and stronger fraud
deterrents.").
55. Id. at 202 ("The bank determined that its eBanking product was a "high risk"
system that required enhanced security, and in particular, multifactor authentication.").
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system, provided by Cyota Inc., 56 was incorporated into Ocean Bank's
existing online banking security system that had been provided by Jack
Henry to comply with FFIEC guidance.57 The Cyota system included
six distinct features. 58 First, user IDs and passwords were implemented
in order for PATCO employees or online banking customers to access
relevant accounts.59  Second, invisible device authentication was
installed through the use of "cookies." 60 Third, the system included
"risk profiling" which produced risk scores for every transaction based
on a multitude of data.61 Fourth, users were asked to answer challenge
questions depending on the type of transaction and risk score.62 Fifth, a
dollar amount rule was implemented which automatically triggered
challenge questions for transactions over a certain dollar figure.
63
Finally, a subscription to the "eFraud network" was offered so that the
bank and other financial institutions could report IP addresses that had
been associated with fraud.64 However, the bank's new security system
56. Cyota, Inc. focuses on online security and anti-fraud solutions for financial
institutions and was acquired by RSA Security in December 2005. See RSA Security to
Acquire Cyota; Creates Leading Provider of Layered Authentication Solutions, RSA: THE
SECURITY OF EMC (Dec. 5, 2005), http://www.rsa.com/press-release.aspx?id=6316.
57. Pateo, 684 F.3d at 202 ("Through collaboration with RSA/Cyota, Jack Henry made
two multifactor authentication products available to its customers to meet the FFIEC
Guidance: the "Basic" package and the "Premium" package. Ocean Bank selected the Jack
Henry "Premium" package, which it implemented by January 2007.").
58. Id. at 202-03.
59. Inside the PATCO Fraud Ruling, supra note 35 ("PATCO employees were
required to enter a company ID/password, as well as a user-specific ID and password to
access online banking.").
60. Id. ("The system used "cookies" to create a log of known devices customers used
to access accounts. If the cookie changed or was new, it could impact the risk score,
potentially triggering challenge questions.").
61. See Smith et al., supra note 21, at 2 ("'Cookies' were placed onto computers that
correctly logged into an account to flag certain computers as low risks when logged in.");
see also Inside the PA TCO Fraud Ruling, supra note 35 ("Jack Henry's adaptive monitoring
provided a risk score for every log-in attempt and transaction based on a multitude of data,
including IP address, device cookie identification, geo location and transaction history.").
62. Inside the PATCO Fraud Ruling, supra note 35 ("[U]sers were required to establish
three challenge questions and responses, which could come into play for various reasons, as
detailed above. If the user failed to answer the questions in three attempts, then that user
would be blocked from online banking.").
63. See Smith et al., supra note 21 ("When a certain dollar figure transaction was
entered, challenge questions were asked. However, Ocean Bank lowered the trigger amount
from $100,000 to $1.00 before the fraudulent withdrawals"); see also Inside the PATCO
Fraud Ruling, supra note 35 ("The Jack Henry system allowed the bank to set transaction
thresholds, above which challenge questions would be triggered - even if user ID, password
and device cookies all were valid.").
64. See Inside the PA TCO Fraud Ruling, supra note 35 (stating that banks could use
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did not include every possible security feature. 65  For instance, the
package did not include: (1) out-of-band authentication that would
allow for authentication via telephone, e-mail or text message; 66 (2)
user-selected pictures to assist with account recognition; 67 (3) tokens,
such as a USB device, that would automatically generate passwords;
68
or (4) the monitoring of risk-scoring reports by bank personnel.69
Ultimately, each of these factors proved to be very important when the
court made its decisions regarding whether or not Ocean Bank's
security system was "commercially reasonable" and whether the bank
was liable for third-party fraud.7°
C. District Court's Decision
At the district court level, the court referred to the FFIEC
guidelines and held that Ocean Bank had sufficiently followed and
implemented a multifactor authentication system as recommended by
the 2005 Guidance. 71 In this decision, the court separated its approach
into three factors for determining the reasonableness of the bank's
security measures and the existence of layered security measures.7
First, the court looked to the "something you know" factor, referring to
bank's implementation of challenge questions and passwords.73 Next,
the network to report IP addresses that had been previously connected with fraud).
65. Patco, 684 F.3d at 203 ("There were several additional security measures that were
available to Ocean Bank but that the bank chose not to implement ... ").
66. Inside the PATCO Fraud Ruling, supra note 35 ("[Olut-of-band generally refers to
transactions authenticated via telephone, e-mail or SMS/text message to a customer.").
67. Id. ("The use of user-selected pictures for authentication was available, but Ocean
Bank declined the option.").
68. Id. ("Physical devices such as USB, smartcard or password-generating tokens were
not available from Jack Henry, but were offered by other vendors. Ocean Bank did not offer
tokens until after the PATCO fraud incidents.").
69. Id. ("At the time of the fraudulent transactions, bank personnel did not monitor the
risk-scoring reports they received, the court says, nor did the bank conduct any ongoing
review of transactions that generated high-risk scores. The bank had the ability to manually
monitor high-risk transactions through its transaction-profiling and risk-scoring system, but
chose not to do so.").
70. Patco, 684 F.3d at 203.
71. Patco Const. Co. v. Peoples United Bank, CIV. 09-503-P-H, 2011 WL 3420588 (D.
Me. Aug. 4, 2011), affg Patco Const. Co. v. People's United Bank, No. 2:09-CV-503-DBH,
2011 WL 2174507 (D. Me. May 27,2011); see also Navetta, supra note 1, at 24-25.
72. Id.
73. See Bert Knabe, Is Protecting Businesses Deposits the Banks Responsibility?,
LUBBOCK AVALANCHE-J. (June 8, 2011), http://lubbockonline.corninteract/blog-post/bert-
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the court looked at the "something you have" factor by examining the
use of device cookies to identify particular computers used to access
online banking accounts.74 Under this system, if the cookie changed or
was installed on a different computer, the transaction was assigned a
higher risk score, which could then result in the user being asked a
challenge question.75 Finally, under the "something you are" factor, the
court focused on the bank's examination of the online identity, such as
the IP address, of individuals accessing an online banking account.
76
The court also focused on the bank's use of layered security.77 In this
case, the implementation of layered security included controls to
analyze customer behavior, such as risk profiling.78  Using the
information obtained through risk profiling, the bank's system would
assign a risk score to a particular banking session that could trigger
challenge questions.
7 9
In its decision, the district court specifically stated that Ocean
Bank's security was not optimal.80  However, the court held that a
"commercially reasonable" system does not have to be the best security
system available. 8' As a result, the court found that the bank had
technically implemented multifactor authentication per the FFIEC 2005
Guidance and was not liable for the loss suffered by PATCO.82
knabe/2011-06-08/protecting-businesses-deposits-banks-responsibility.
74. See id.; Patco Const. Co. v. Peoples United Bank, CIV. 09-503-P-H, 2011 WL
3420588 (D. Me. Aug. 4, 2011), affg Patco Const. Co. v. People's United Bank, No. 2:09-
CV-503-DBH, 2011 WL 2174507 (D. Me. May 27, 2011); see also Navetta, supra note 1, at
24-25.
75. Patco Const. Co. v. Peoples United Bank, CIV. 09-503-P-H, 2011 WL 3420588 (D.
Me. Aug. 4, 2011), affg Patco Const. Co. v. People's United Bank, No. 2:09-CV-503-DBH,
2011 WL 2174507 (D. Me. May 27, 2011); see also Navetta, supra note 1, at 24-25 (2011).
76. See Knabe, supra note 73.
77. Patco Const. Co. v. Peoples United Bank, CIV. 09-503-P-H, 2011 WL 3420588 (D.
Me. Aug. 4, 2011), affg Patco Const. Co. v. People's United Bank, No. 2:09-CV-503-DBH,
2011 WL 2174507 (D. Me. May 27, 2011); see also Navetta, supra note 1, at 24-25 (2011).
78. See Navetta, supra note 1, at 24-25 (2011). ("[T]he location of the user logging in;
when and how often the online banking system was previously used by the customer; the
activities the user typically engaged in; the Internet Protocol (IP) address typically used by
the customer to log-in; and the size, type, and frequency of payment orders normally issued
by the customer.").
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id. (stating that although the challenge questions were held to be irrelevant,
because they were triggered for every transaction, the system was still technically a
multifactor authentication system).
2013]
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D. First Circuit Reverses
In July 2012, the First Circuit found that Ocean Bank's security
was not "commercially reasonable" for several reasons.8 3  First, the
Bank's practice of requiring every transaction of $1 or more to be
approved via challenge questions increased the risk of fraud. 84 Here,
despite the fact that Ocean Bank thought it was using the safest setting,
no specific transaction would be afforded additional security because
every transaction was flagged on this factor.85  Furthermore, asking
challenge questions for every transaction allowed fraudsters the
opportunity to capture the answers through malware.86 By lowering the
dollar amount requirement to $1 for every transaction, Ocean Bank
deprived the complex system "of its core functionality." 87 Second, the
First Circuit held that Ocean Bank's failure to properly monitor
transactions and notify customers of high risk transactions were
unreasonable practices.88 In this case, Ocean Bank had failed to notify
PATCO of the suspicious transactions despite a risk score of 790, which
was much higher than PATCO's typical risk scores.89 As a result, the
First Circuit found that Ocean Bank had implemented a "one-size-fits-
all" approach to providing online banking security, which exposed
PATCO to additional risk.90 Finally, the First Circuit held that PATCO
failed to implement additional, available security procedures to offset
the negative effects of the $1 dollar rule and its failure to notify PATCO
about at-risk customers. 91 Ultimately, "these collective failures, taken
83. See Patco Const. Co. v. People's United Bank, 684 F.3d 197, 199 (1st Cir. 2012);
see also Inside the PATCO Fraud Ruling, supra note 35.
84. See id.
85. See Greg Pulles & Brent Ylvisaker, First Circuit's Ruling Finds Bank's Actions
"Commercially Unreasonable" Under UCC Article 4A (July 9, 2012), DORSEY & WHITNEY
LLP, http://www.dorsey.com/eU-finreg-patco_070912/ ("The bank thought it was making
the system safer by setting the threshold at $1, effectively asking the challenge questions for
every transaction.").
86. Id. ("The court's conclusion that asking challenge questions for every transaction
enabled fraudsters using malware or keylogging to capture the answers.").
87. See Patco, 684 F.3d at 199 ("The $1 dollar amount rule guaranteed that challenge
questions would be triggered on every transaction, unless caught by a separate eFraud
Network.").
88. See id. at 211.
89. Id. at 204 (PATCO's usual risk scores ranged between 10 and 214).
90. See id. at 212.
91. Id. ("Ocean Bank introduced no additional security measures in tandem with its
decision to lower the dollar amount rule, despite the fact that several such security measures
[Vol. 17
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as a whole, rendered Ocean Bank's security procedures commercially
unreasonable.92
E. Questions Left Open
Although the First Circuit's reversal was significant, a number
of important questions were still left unanswered.93  The primary
question left undecided was whether PATCO had satisfied its
obligations and responsibilities under U.C.C. § 4A-202.94 The First
Circuit remanded this question to the district court in order to resolve
the genuine and disputed issues of fact that were material to this
question.95 The parties also disagreed on what particularly triggered the
fraud attacks.96 Another point of contention surrounded whether or not
PATCO had been offered the opportunity to receive e-mail alerts.97 On
one hand, Ocean Bank claimed that it began offering e-mail alerts in
2007.98 However, PATCO claimed that it was never made aware of this
option and its requests for e-mail alerts were ignored.99 As a result, the
First Circuit could not make a decision regarding whether these alerts
were made available or whether they would have had a significant
impact. 00
were not uncommon in the industry and were relatively easy to implement.").
92. Id. at 213.
93. Patco Const. Co. v. People's United Bank, 684 F.3d 197, 214 (1st Cir. 2012)
("There remain several genuine and disputed issues of fact which may be material to the
question of whether Patco has satisfied its obligations and responsibilities under Article 4A,
or at least to the question of damages.").
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. ("The parties disagree over whether key-logging malware enabled the
fraudulent transactions.").
97. Id. ("As to the genuine and disputed issues of fact, the parties dispute the facts
surrounding Patco's lack of e-mail alerts.").
98. Id. at 203 ("Ocean Bank asserts that on December 1, 2006, as it began to
implement the Jack Henry system, it also began to offer the option of e-mail alerts to its
eBanking customers.").
99. Patco Const. Co. v. People's United Bank, 684 F.3d 197, 214 (1st Cir. 2012)
("Patco alleges that it requested e-mail alerts from the bank, but that the bank ignored these
requests and never notified Patco when e-mail alerts became available to bank customers.").
100. Id. ("[N]either party has submitted into the record an example of such an e-mail
alert or specified when such an e-mail alert would have been sent, such that it is unclear
what Patco would have learned from such an e-mail alert and whether and when such an e-
mail would have placed Patco on notice of the fraudulent transfer.").
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IV. WAS THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S HOLDING CORRECT?
A. Precedent
The First Circuit's decision that Ocean Bank's security system
was commercially unreasonable ignored precedent that focused on
conformance to FFIEC guidelines, and thus overlooked a number of
policy considerations related to online banking. In several prior
decisions, 10' courts have focused on conformance to FFIEC guidelines
as one of the key factors in determining whether a bank can be held
liable for third-party fraud. 10 2  Pursuant to FFIEC recommendations,
Ocean Bank offered a security system equipped with User ID,
Password, Device ID, Risk Profiling, and Challenge Questions. 0 3
However, these factors were found to be insufficient as the First Circuit
decided to enforce a higher standard than merely conforming to FFIEC
recommendations. 0 4  This decision was a significant detour from
previous holdings that determined a system was "commercially
reasonable" strictly in light of FFIEC conformance.
0 5
For example, in an earlier case, Experi-Metal. Inc. v. Comerica
Bank, 0 6 the court concluded that, while the bank had not adopted the
best security system possible, the system could still be considered
"commercially reasonable" based on following the then-existing
standards suggested by the FFIEC.' °7  In Experi-Metal, the court
focused primarily on whether the banks initiated layered security
through behavioral analytics to further authenticate a customer's
101. See Experi-Metal. Inc. v. Comerica Bank, No. 09-14890, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
62677 (E.D. Mich. June 13, 2011); Braga Filho v. Interaudi Bank, 334 F. App'x 381 (2nd
Cir. 2009); Covina 2000 Ventures Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No.
06 Civ. 15497, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32799 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2008); Regatos v. N. Fork
Bank, 257 F. Supp. 2d 632 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Centre-Point Merchant Bank Ltd. v. American
Express Bank Ltd., No. 95 Civ. 5000, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17296 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27,
2000).
102. See Navetta, supra note 1, at 24; see also Hene, supra note 22 (discussing five past
cases and their definitions of the commercially reasonable standard).
103. Patco Const. Co. v. People's United Bank, 684 F.3d 197, 202-203 (1st Cir. 2012).
104. Id. at 210-213.
105. Experi-Metal, Inc. v. Comerica Bank, No. 09-14890, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62677
(E.D. Mich. June 13, 2011); see also John Krahmer, Wire Transfers, Good Faith, and
"Phishing ", 65 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 420, 420 (2011).
106. Experi-Metal, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62677.
107. Krahmer, supra note 105.
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identity as recommended by the FFIEC. 10 8  The Experi-Metal court
concluded that although the bank had implemented layered security, it
did not implement behavioral analytics to further authenticate the
identity of users. 109  As a result, the court treated the FFIEC
recommendations like de facto regulation and found that the bank failed
to act in good faith, because it did not strictly conform to these
guidelines.1 0
The district court followed this precedent in Patco by holding
that existing layered security measures incorporating some behavioral
analytics were sufficient to determine reasonableness."' The court
looked to the 2005 Guidance and noted that the guidance did not
recommend any specific security measures or procedures."12  Instead,
the court analyzed the agreement between PATCO and Ocean Bank and
whether Ocean Bank had implemented multi-factor authentication
requirements. 1 3 The court felt that it was enough that Ocean Bank had
technically met the requirements of the 2005 Guidance and ruled that
the system was "commercially reasonable."'1 4  The First Circuit,
however, decided to require more than a technical implementation of
FFIEC recommendations largely based on a policy decision to require
more than one-size-fits-all approach."15
108. Experi-Metal, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62677; see also Navetta, supra note 1, at
22,24 (quoting the FFIEC's key point) ("The agencies consider single-factor authentication,
as the only control mechanism, to be inadequate for high risk transactions involving access
to customer information or the movement of funds to other parties. Financial institutions
offering Internet-based products and services to their customers should use effective
methods to authenticate the identity of customers using those products and services. The
authentication techniques employed by the financial institution should be appropriate to the
risks associated with those products and services. Account fraud and identity theft are
frequently the result of singlefactor (e.g., ID/password) authentication exploitation. Where
risk assessments indicate that the use of single-factor authentication is inadequate, financial
institutions should implement multifactor authentication, layered security, or other controls
reasonably calculated to mitigate those risks.").
109. Id.
110. See Navetta, supra note 1, at 25.
111. See id.
112. Patco Const. Co. v. Peoples United Bank, CIV. 09-503-P-H, 2011 WL 3420588 (D.
Me. Aug. 4, 2011), affg Patco Const. Co. v. People's United Bank, No. 2:09-CV-503-DBH,
2011 WL 2174507, at *7 (D. Me. May 27, 2011) ("The Guidance does not endorse any
particular technology for compliance with the Guidance.").
113. See Patco Const. Co. v. Peoples United Bank, CIV. 09-503-P-H, 2011 WL
3420588 (D. Me. Aug. 4, 2011), affg Patco Const. Co. v. People's United Bank, No. 2:09-
CV-503-DBH, 2011 WL 2174507, at *32 (D. Me. May 27, 2011).
114. See id.
115. See Inside the PATCO Fraud Ruling, supra note 35.
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One of the main implications of this decision will be
determining which party was better equipped to bear the responsibility
of making sure certain security measures are effective.1 16 Attorneys for
small businesses argue that these companies are often not equipped to
bear the risk and lack a proper understanding of cyberthreats when they
accept a bank's security procedures.' 17 Consequently, small business
owners believe that banks should bear a higher responsibility for
making sure that their own security procedures are effective based on
the current make-up of cyberthreats." 8  While banks may be better
equipped to bear the responsibility for their security systems than small
business owners, it is a more difficult argument to assert that they
should be responsible for implementing security measures beyond what
the FFIEC recommends.1 9 In an area of law where neither courts nor
the FFIEC have specified a definite standard for determining the
commercial reasonableness of a security system, there could be several
negative consequences stemming from the decision to require banks to
do more.
B. Negative Consequences of the Holding
1. Increased Liability for Banks Whose Customers Are the Victims of
Third-Party Fraud
The Patco decision could increase bank liability far beyond the
scope of the protective language contained in their online banking
agreements.12 0  While requiring banks to do more than rely on their
contracts in order to comply with the "commercially reasonable"
standard for their systems does have some merit, it may be burdensome
to force them to meet an undefined standard. After Patco, it is no longer
sufficient to have a generally accepted security procedure in place and
conformance to FFIEC guidelines will not provide a safe harbor for
116. Joe Palazzolo, Cyberthieves Hit Owners, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2012, at B7,
available at:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052702303612804577533503876570164.html?mo
d=djemSBjh#.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See Navetta, supra note 1, at 23.
120. See Funnell, supra note 34.
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banks attempting to avoid liability. 2' Instead, a bank's security system
will now be subject to an additional prong of analysis regarding whether
or not it is being implemented in a way that makes sense to the court.
122
In fact, if a bank's procedures do not pass a specific judge's
examination or a court finds that they were not implemented perfectly,
the bank may be exposed to additional liability. 123 Furthermore, banks
may be assigned an even greater responsibility for educating their
customers in online security. 124 While fraud prevention education may
result in a decreased chance of cybertheft, 25 it will impose a large
burden for banks to not only protect their customers, but to also educate
them. Client education is now strongly recommended by FFIEC
guidelines, but it is unclear whether education will either provide an
additional defense for banks whose customers don't take their advice or
provide another means for fraud victims to allege bank liability.
126
One effect of the increased liability for banks is that they will
likely shift the additional costs and burden to their customers.127 The
increased liability will force banks to pay more in settlements,
implement more expensive security protocols, and take the time to
examine what the cost of doing business with certain customers might
be.' 28 Hence, banks will likely charge more for their services to account
for the increased cost. 129  In fact, the First Circuit's decision may
persuade banks to not even consider certain small businesses as
customers if they could be considered at-risk and require extra security,
education, and liability.' 30
A counterargument exists that the Patco decision may not be as
121. See 3 Lessons, supra note 13 (interview with information security attorney Joe
Burton) ("It's not enough just to have a generally accepted security procedure in place if
that procedure is not implemented in a way that makes sense.").
122. See id.
123. See Funnell, supra note 34.
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Palazzolo, supra note 116.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See id. ("William T. Repasky, a Louisville, Ky., lawyer who represents financial
institutions, says the First Circuit ruling could prompt some banks to view small businesses
as higher risk customers. As a result, banks might then begin to pass on to small business
customers their own increased costs for added security and customer education, he
predicts.").
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favorable for bank customers as predicted. 131 One major question left
undecided by the First Circuit was: What is the responsibility of the
customer even if a bank's security procedures are found to be
commercially unreasonable?13 2  Since the First Circuit remanded this
decision to the lower court, this unanswered question may actually end
up favoring banks regardless of the reasonableness of their
procedures. 133
2. Cost Burden on Smaller Banks
A clear consideration in the First Circuit's decision in Patco was
which specific security measures had been implemented and which had
not been put in place. 134 According to the First Circuit, Ocean Bank
chose not to implement out-of-band authentication' 35 and tokens, which
were both security measures recommended by the FFIEC and offered to
the bank by their security provider.' 36  In addition to these
recommended measures, the First Circuit also addressed two other
measures 3 7 that the bank chose not to implement which might have
protected its customers from third-party fraud.138 By pointing out these
security omissions and the fact that Ocean Bank was able to upgrade its
procedures after the fraud attacks, the First Circuit implied that it will
view the offering of additional security procedures as a positive factor
for banks trying to avoid liability for third-party fraud. 139 As a result,
131. See 3 Lessons, supra note 13.
132. See Patco Const. Co. v. People's United Bank, 684 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2012); see
also 3 Lessons, supra note 13.
133. See 3 Lessons, supra note 13 (interview with information security attorney Joe
Burton) ("It opens the possibility that you have a circumstance where you had a
commercially unreasonable procedure that was utilized by the bank, but the liability might
not be on the bank because there may be responsibility [on] the customer.").
134. See Patco, 684 F.3d at 203-04.
135. Id. at 203 ("Out-of-band authentication generally refers to additional steps or
actions taken beyond the technology boundaries of a typical transaction. Examples of out-
of-band authentication include notification to the customer, callback (voice) verification, e-
mail approval from the customer, and cell phone based challenge/response processes.")
(footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. Id. at 204 ("Tokens are physical devices (something the person has), such as a USB
token device, a smart card, or a password-generating token.").
137. Id. at 203-04 (mentioning user-selected picture and monitoring of risk-scoring
reports).
138. Id. at 204.
139. Id. at 204 ("Since then, the bank has instituted a policy of calling the customer in
the case of uncharacteristic transactions .... ").
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the First Circuit established that merely implementing the few security
measures that are both recommended by the FFIEC and offered to the
bank will not be sufficient.140 If banks want to avoid the possibility of
any potential liability, they will be additionally burdened to implement
all available security measures and upgrade their systems anytime they
are offered a new feature.
The negative effect of this movement is evident for smaller
banks and financial institutions that do not have extensive resources and
capabilities.' 4' First, smaller banks, which may have a number of small
business customers, will be burdened by lawsuits and the need to
purchase additional fraud insurance. 42  Also, smaller banks may not
have the ability to pay the high costs to implement and maintain more
expensive and advanced security systems offered and recommended to
them. 43 In fact, the First Circuit's policy of deterring a one-size-fits-all
approach to security is in stark contrast to the practice of many small
banks which simply launch a standardized approach to fraud
detection. 144  Finally, smaller banks will be even more inclined to
reconsider taking small businesses or other at-risk companies on as
customers. 145  When dealing with small banks that do not have the
resources to monitor a significant percentage of their daily log-ins and
transactions, businesses should be more inclined to implement their own
security procedures. 146
Proponents for additional responsibility for banks will be quick
to point out that the Patco ruling will not necessarily bring burdensome
implications for banks across the country because of the number of
questions left undecided or remanded.147  However, this particular
ruling should be considered a significant one despite any questions that
140. See Patco Const. Co. v. People's United Bank, 684 F.3d 197, 204 (lst Cir. 2012).
141. See 3 Lessons, supra note 13.
142. See Client Alert, Richard J. Bortnick & Gary M. Klinger, Cozen O'Connor LLP,
First Circuit Court of Appeals Holds Bank's Online Security Measures "Commercially
Unreasonable" in Landmark Decision, (July 20, 2012),
http://www.cozen.com/admin/files/publications/GIG%20ALert-7-20.pdf (stating that
consumers need to purchase tailored insurance to protect themselves).
143. Id.
144. See 3 Lessons, supra note 13 (stating that Gartner's Litan says Ocean Bank's
practices were not atypical for small banks that typically launch a standardized approach to
fraud detection and that consumers should bear the risk).
145. See Funnell, supra note 34.
146. 3 Lessons, supra note 13.
147. See Funnell, supra note 34.
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may be left open.148 This decision is the first appellate case of its type,
and it will have precedential value because it looks to balance the
responsibilities of customers and banks in online transactions, which
has proven to be a very difficult thing to do. 14 9 Also, the decision has
significance because of its potential ability to "open the floodgates" for
fraud victims to sue their banks.1
50
V. ADVICE FOR LEGAL COUNSEL
While the negative consequences of the Patco decision may be
evident, it is unclear which security protocols will be sufficient to
protect banks and customers. For legal counsel representing banks and
customers, advising their clients may prove to be a very difficult task
under the new totality of the circumstances standard.15 1 There a few
recommendations that may guide attorneys who are trying to assist their
clients. 152 For counsel representing banks and financial institutions, it is
important to emphasize the need to continue to take the same
precautions that were important before the Patco decision. 153  These
measures include: (1) requiring that customers maintain their own
security and confidentiality for authentication credentials; (2) limiting
the type of data that a customer may provide to the bank; and (3)
requiring customers to notify them of any data breaches or unauthorized
access to its accounts. 1
54
After Patco, more focus will be placed on a bank's ability to
tailor its security to an individual customer. 155 Banks should attempt to
148. 3 Lessons, supra note 13 (interview with information security attorney Joe Burton)
("The ruling is a 'fairly significant' one, Burton points out, since it's the first appellate case
of this type. 'It's going to have precedential value because it's an appellate court case, and
as you know there really are a small number of cases that have considered the question of
apportioning responsibility between a customer and the bank."').
149. See id.; see also Pulles & Ylvisaker, supra note 85 (stating that the case has
significance as it is one of first impression).
150. See Bortnick & Klinger, supra note 142 (mentioning that the PATCO decision
could have significant implications for financial institutions and their insurers by opening
the floodgates for potential lawsuits).
151. See Patco Const. Co. v. People's United Bank, 684 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting
that the court considered all relevant factors in making its decision).
152. See Ronald Weikers et al., A Practical Approach to Mitigating Data Breach Risk in
an Interconnected World, 2011 EMERGING ISSUES 5832.
153. See id.
154. See id. (outlining recommendations for attorneys who are representing banks).
155. See Pulles & Ylvisaker, supra note 85 (stating that the 1st Circuit focused on
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create individualized customer profiles and select appropriate security
measures based on the customer's specific circumstances. 56 The First
Circuit suggested two proactive measures for banks to avoid a one-size-
fits-all approach: (1) manual reviews of suspect transactions by actual
personnel to determine the legitimacy of a transactions; and (2)
customer verification or notification to authenticate uncharacteristic or
suspicious transfers. 57 Attorneys should recommend that banks adopt
the most of state of the art technology that their size will allow for and
should look to similarly sized banks to examine the type of security
measures that they have in place.158  In line with these
recommendations, the FFIEC's 2011 Supplement went into effect in
January 2012 and recommended that banks adapt their security
measures to anomalous customer behavior. 59  As a result, whether
courts choose to follow the Patco reasoning or rely on conformance to
FFIEC recommendations, it will be important for banks to implement an
individualized security procedure in a way that adapts to changing
circumstances.
On the other side of the spectrum, attorneys representing
consumers should stress the importance of taking every precaution in
their power to mitigate security risks. As they should have done pre-
Patco, counsel should advise their clients to: (1) conduct effective pre-
contract due diligence; (2) require banks to comply with a customer's
own internal security policies; (3) require immediate notification in the
event of a security breach; and (4) require the vendor to obtain cyber-
liability insurance.' 60 The main obligations for customers following the
Patco decision are still undetermined, because the exact responsibilities
Ocean Bank's failure to tailor its security system).
156. Id. ("[Blanks need to create an individual customer risk profile that is then used to
select appropriate security procedures for the customer based on those individual
circumstances.").
157. See Bortnick & Klinger, supra note 142 (listing three ways that the court identified
to enhance security procedures).
158. Pulles & Ylvisaker, supra note 85 ("A bank then needs to adopt state of the art
technology, appropriate for its size and comparable to what other banks in its position are
using, and must review that security protocol periodically.").
159. Id. ("[T]he FFIEC in 2012 issued new guidance on authentication (not discussed by
the parties or the court in Patco), the most significant aspect of which is a mandate that
banks must put in place a security procedure that identifies, addresses and reacts to
anomalous customer behavior.").
160. See Weikers et al., supra note 152 (outlining recommendations for attorneys who
are representing consumers).
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of the customer were left open on remand. 161  Nevertheless, legal
counsel should still advise their clients to request e-mail alerts from
their banks, check their balances daily,' 62 and purchase insurance that is
tailored to their specific needs.'
63
VI. CONCLUSION
The First Circuit's decision to find that Ocean Bank's
multifactor authentication security measures were not "commercially
reasonable" created several negative consequences for banks and
consumers that will change the landscape of online banking. With banks
now facing serious and potentially costly liability implications for
cyber-fraud, it is now time for banks to revisit their contracts,
procedures, disclosures and account applications in order to meet any
additional obligations that will arise.' 64 Both the FFIEC and the courts
have struggled to keep up with the rapidly changing landscape of
cyberthreats. With major advancements in technology happening every
day, a growing number of new threats to banks are also born. For
attorneys trying to stay ahead of the curve, it will be important to advise
their clients to take any and all steps to protect themselves, because if
the First Circuit's decision has shown anything, it is that this landscape
is far from stable.
ROBERT K. BuRROw
161. Patco Const. Co. v. People's United Bank, 684 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2012).
162. See Pulles & Ylvisaker, supra note 85 (listing ways which the consumer may still
be held liable despite the reasonableness of a security system).
163. See Bortnick & Klinger, supra note 142 (stating that parties should not rely on
others to protect them).
164. See Pulles & Ylvisaker, supra note 85 (noting that as a case of first impressions
there could be "serious and potentially costly implications" and stating that banks should
revisit their "procedures, disclosures, the account application, and account agreement").
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